

## Monopoly Practices and Competitive Behaviour in the French Satellite Pay-TV Market

Michele Cincera and Abdul G. Noury  
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### Motivations

- As a result of technological progress in digital broadcasting industry there is a substantial decrease in prices and/or increase in quality of pay-TV services.
- To what extent such changes can be attributed to competition?
- To answer this question we compare the French competitive (pay-TV) market with the British monopolistic (pay-TV) industry.
- Before the comparison we analyse the nature of interactions between (rival) firms in the French pay-TV market.

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## Why France?

- The French SPTV market was characterized by a monopoly till 1997 but since then there are three firms competing together.
- Availability of monthly data that “allows” structural econometric estimations.
- The French competitive situation can be compared with the British or Italian monopolistic cases.

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## Related literature

- Theory
  - Armstrong (1999)
  - Harbord and Ottaviani (2002)
  - Nilssen and Sorgard (2000)
  - Anderson and Coate (2002)
  - Spence and Owen (1977)
- Empirical
  - Waterman and Weiss (1996)
  - Chipty (2001)
  - Golsbee and Petrin (2004)

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## Relevant market

- Satellite Pay-TV market vs. Cable TV, Terrestrial (or Air-to-Air TV) and ADSL.
- EU Antitrust authorities have identified the Pay TV market as a separate one from the free access TV market.
- Barabes and Encaoua (2002): same conclusion for France.
- Subscription rates in 2002 in France: 35% for Cable Pay TV vs. 65% for Satellite Pay TV.

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## Data



- Monthly data collected from TeleSatellite magazine.
- Variables:
  - Micro: net subscription prices, number of subscribers, advertising effort, number of channels, and
  - Macroeconomic variables affecting demand: industrial production index, the number of unemployed, and seasonal dummies.
- Limits and advantages of the data.

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## Descriptive statistics

Variable		Mean	Std. error	Min	Max
net annual subscription price (euros)	p1	288.13	29.12	228.67	334.78
	p2	269.38	37.05	158.55	300.02
# of subscribers	q1	1212789	508735	200000	2000000
	q2	726392	361634	0	1172000
advertising	a1	1069	268	447	1414
	a2	810	268	0	1083
total # of channels	nt1	73.68	19.8	29	108
	nt2	49.36	10.3	16	59
total # of channels in the basic bundle	nb1	37.83	14	15	56
	nb2	40	9.53	21	52
total # of channels in the movie bundle	nc1	6.53	1.51	5	11
	nc2	3.76	0.78	3	5
total # of bundles	o1	9.25	1	5	11
	o2	7.49	2.12	2	11
industrial production index (OECD)	y	112.59	4.72	101.3	118.3

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1 = CS

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2 = TPS

## Methodology (Gasmi et al. 1992)

### ■ Demand equation:

$$N_i = \gamma_{i0} + \alpha_{ii}p_i + \alpha_{ij}p_j + \gamma_{ii}A_i^{\frac{1}{2}} + \gamma_{ij}A_j^{\frac{1}{2}}, \quad i, j = 1, 2 \quad i \neq j$$

$$\gamma_{i0} = \beta_{i0} + \beta_{i1}Y + \beta_{i2}D + \beta_{i3}U, \quad i = 1, 2$$

### ■ Cost equation:


$$c_i = \eta_{i1}B_i + \eta_{i2}F_i + \eta_{i3}S_i + \eta_{i4}O_i \quad i = 1, 2$$

### ■ Profit:

$$\pi_i(p_i, p_j) = (p_i - c_i)(\gamma_{i0} + \alpha_{ii}p_i + \alpha_{ij}p_j + \gamma_{ii}A_i^{\frac{1}{2}} + \gamma_{ij}A_j^{\frac{1}{2}}) - K_i - A_i \quad i = 1, 2 \quad i \neq j$$

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## System of 4 equations (2 demand equations + 2 first order conditions) to be estimated (by 3SLS):

$$N_1 - \gamma_{10} - \alpha_{11}p_1 - \alpha_{12}p_2 - \gamma_{11}A_1^{\frac{1}{2}} - \gamma_{12}A_2^{\frac{1}{2}} = \epsilon_1$$


$$N_2 - \gamma_{20} - \alpha_{21}p_1 - \alpha_{22}p_2 - \gamma_{21}A_1^{\frac{1}{2}} - \gamma_{22}A_2^{\frac{1}{2}} = \epsilon_2$$

$$N_1 + v_{11}p_1 + v_{12}p_2 - \delta_{11}B_1 - \delta_{12}F_1 - \delta_{13}S_1 - \delta_{14}O_1 = \epsilon_3$$

$$N_2 + v_{21}p_1 + v_{22}p_2 - \delta_{21}B_2 - \delta_{22}F_2 - \delta_{23}S_2 - \delta_{24}O_2 = \epsilon_4$$

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## Strategic behaviour

- Competitive (Nash) model  $v_{ii} = \alpha_{ii}, i = 1, 2$  and  $v_{12} = v_{21} = 0$

- Stackelberg with CanalSatellite as leader

$$p_1 = \frac{1}{2}c_1 - \frac{h_1}{2h_0}\gamma_0 - \frac{h_2}{2h_0}A_1^{1/2} - \frac{h_3}{2h_0}A_2^{1/2} - \frac{h_4}{2h_0}c_2$$

$$\begin{aligned} h_0 &= \alpha_{11} - \frac{\alpha_{12}\alpha_{21}}{2\alpha_{22}} \\ h_1 &= 1 - \frac{\alpha_{12}}{2\alpha_{22}} \\ h_2 &= \gamma_{12} - \frac{\alpha_{12}\gamma_{21}}{2\alpha_{22}} \\ h_3 &= \gamma_{22} - \frac{\alpha_{12}\gamma_{22}}{2\alpha_{22}} \\ h_4 &= \frac{\alpha_{12}}{2\alpha_{22}} \end{aligned}$$

- Stackelberg with TPS as leader
- Collusion on Price

$$\begin{aligned} p_1 &= \frac{1}{\alpha_{11}}c_1 - \frac{1}{\alpha_{11}}N_1 - \frac{\alpha_{21}}{\alpha_{11}}p_2 + \frac{\alpha_{21}}{\alpha_{11}}c_2 \\ p_2 &= \frac{1}{\alpha_{22}}c_2 - \frac{1}{\alpha_{22}}N_2 - \frac{\alpha_{12}}{\alpha_{22}}p_1 + \frac{\alpha_{12}}{\alpha_{22}}c_1 \end{aligned}$$

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	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Nash		Leader TPS		Leader CanalSat		Tacit collusion	
	Q TPS	Q CS	Q TPS	Q CS	Q TPS	Q CS	Q TPS	Q CS
Constant	-205 (1.16)	-399 (2.20)**	-208 (1.18)	-429 (2.35)**	-197 (1.11)	-427 (2.35)**	-190 (1.07)	-414 (2.27)**
Qt-1	0.555 (7.80)***	0.182 (3.05)***	0.550 (7.72)***	0.186 (3.12)***	0.549 (7.69)***	0.171 (2.90)***	0.556 (7.79)***	0.182 (3.06)***
P TPS	-18.087 (1.15)	14.162 (0.81)	-16.309 (1.03)	9.192 (0.52)	-16.560 (1.05)	15.670 (0.90)	-18.644 (1.18)	13.273 (0.76)
P CS	18.773 (0.67)	-63.245 (2.01)**	18.532 (0.66)	-60.606 (1.92)*	-6.159 (0.22)	-95.005 (3.04)***	11.163 (0.40)	-69.272 (2.20)**
A TPS	515 (5.65)***	-270 (2.94)***	518 (5.68)***	-281 (3.04)***	515 (5.62)***	-291 (3.17)***	517 (5.65)***	-267 (2.90)***
A CS	-182 (2.68)***	1,214 (12.25)***	-182 (2.68)***	1,212 (12.14)***	-186 (2.73)***	1,228 (12.43)***	-183 (2.69)***	1,205 (12.13)***
S2	-9,339 (1.40)	-7,726 (1.01)	-9,411 (1.41)	-7,100 (0.92)	-10,198 (1.52)	-10,003 (1.31)	-9,082 (1.36)	-7,514 (0.98)
S3	-15,645 (2.31)**	-20,637 (2.66)***	-15,568 (2.30)**	-21,388 (2.74)***	-16,424 (2.42)**	-22,367 (2.89)***	-15,657 (2.31)**	-20,046 (2.58)**
S4	-288 (0.04)	1,785 (0.22)	-420 (0.06)	1,336 (0.17)	-298 (0.04)	1,319 (0.17)	-13,265 (0.00)	2,311 (0.29)
Y	1,779 (0.94)	1,156 (0.58)	1,785 (0.94)	1,510 (0.75)	2,109 (1.11)	1,926 (0.96)	1,762 (0.93)	1,441 (0.72)
T	3,045 (4.29)***	7,580 (10.23)***	3,082 (4.34)***	7,580 (10.19)***	3,297 (4.63)***	7,953 (10.81)***	3,087 (4.34)***	7,647 (10.33)***
Observations	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
R <sup>2</sup> a	0.9278	0.8948	0.9281	0.8947	0.9274	0.8964	0.9285	0.8972
F stat	96.53	66.22	96.51	66.38	96.23	66.12	96.21	65.87

## Vuong Test

- Vuong (1989) developed a test for nonnested models. It is based on LR corrected for the number of estimated parameters.
- The test statistic is ass. normal under the null hypothesis (i.e. both models are equivalent).

	<b>M2</b>	<b>M3</b>	<b>M4</b>
<b>M1</b>	<b>3.98</b>	<b>5.12</b>	<b>2.57</b>
<b>M2</b>		<b>2.11</b>	<b>-0.27</b>
<b>M3</b>			<b>-2.44</b>



## Comparison with the British Case

- Note the preliminary and static aspects of comparison.
- Is this result still valid across periods and/or space?

	BskyB (UK)		CS (FR)		TPS (FR)	
	min	Max	min	Max	min	Max
Premium Movies	0	12	0	11	0	7
Premium Kids	0	4	0	9	0	3
Premium Sports	0	4	0	7	0	7
Price (EUR)	17	54	17	35	17	33

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## Conclusions

- Given the sample size, and assumption on functional forms, care must be taken when interpreting our results.
- Our structural estimations produces similar results for four competitive behaviours.
- Vuong test suggests that the data can best be explained by Stackelberg model with CanalSatellite as leader.
- A comparison with the British [and Italian case] show that despite similarities, packages of pay-TV services are cheaper in France.
- But, one needs more precise methods (hedonic regression) to reach firm conclusion on cross country comparisons.

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